In November 2022, then-international relations minister Naledi Pandor sparked outrage after her department extended an invitation to her Iranian counterpart, Hossein Amir Abdollahian, to visit South Africa.
The proposed visit was scheduled to take place during the country’s annual 16 Days of Activism Against Violence Against Women campaign. It was noted that for the preceding two months the Islamic Republic of Iran had been engaged in a violent crackdown on protesters associated with the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement.
These protests were triggered by demands for accountability following the death of Mahsa Amini at the hands of Iran’s so-called morality police, after she was allegedly wearing her hijab improperly.
The crackdown was severe. More than 550 people were killed and about 20,000 arrested. Critics argued that inviting the senior representative of a regime that systematically denies women basic rights, at the very moment South Africa was publicly committing itself to combating gender-based violence, represented a direct contradiction of constitutional values.
Pandor, who now chairs the Nelson Mandela Foundation, dismissed these concerns, stating, “I am of the view that an engagement could enrich the efforts of both countries towards the empowerment of women. South Africa makes its views heard in different forums, depending on the context and individual incidents. We will engage with Iran on concerns we have regarding discrimination and violence against women.”
Once again South Africa finds itself at a contradiction between our constitutional principles and our political alignment. This weekend the country is for the first time hosting the Iranian navy, alongside those of China, Russia and possibly several other unnamed Brics countries, for joint military exercises. As these foreign, undemocratic militaries are received with ceremony and fanfare, ordinary Iranians are out on the streets facing repression for asserting the most basic of their rights.
Since late last month protests have erupted in Tehran over soaring inflation and rising food prices. These demonstrations have since evolved into a nationwide campaign against the repression of the mullahs’ regime. The state response has been entirely predictable, involving violence, mass arrests, internet shutdowns and the killing of protesters. The rights to free assembly, protest and expression are explicitly protected in South Africa’s constitution, yet the country continues to align itself with a regime that violates these freedoms as a matter of routine.
In 2025 the Middle East Africa Research Institute published a report examining South Africa-Iran relations and seeking to explain why South African foreign policy so readily sacrifices constitutional imperatives in favour of Iranian ties. The findings were illuminating. Economics plays little to no role in the relationship. Trade with Iran amounted to just under R300m in 2023, placing it outside South Africa’s top-30 trading partners and well behind countries such as Thailand and Oman.
Iran is also not a strategic partner. Its historic role as a guarantor of oil supplies has long since been replaced by a diverse range of alternative suppliers.
Instead, the report found that the relationship is driven primarily by political factors, rooted within the ANC, particularly the historical, ideological and financial realm. Officially, Iran was an opponent of apartheid and was an ally of the ANC. Despite this posture, it conducted hundreds of millions of dollars in clandestine oil-for-weapons trade with the former South African regime.
At the same time Iran provided material, public and financial support to the ANC in exile, so the organisation was happy to turn a blind eye to this association and rapidly established state-based ties after 1994. In addition, Iran’s hostility towards liberal democracies, especially the US and Israel, aligned neatly with the ANC’s enduring anticolonial worldview.
There is, however, an additional and more troubling dimension to this relationship. Under apartheid the ANC relied heavily on foreign sponsorship to sustain its activities. This practice continued after it assumed power, with foreign policy positions — on, for example, Nigeria, Indonesia and Taiwan — frequently exchanged for financial support to shore up chronically strained party finances.
In Iran’s case it has been alleged that South Africa’s diplomatic backing of Iran’s nuclear programme formed part of a quid pro quo to assist MTN in securing an operating licence in the country. At the time, Cyril Ramaphosa served as chairperson of the company. In 2026, the Constitutional Court is expected to rule on whether a case testing these bribery allegations may proceed in South African courts. Should the court give the go-ahead, the proceedings are likely to expose the financial underpinnings of South Africa’s relationship with Iran in unprecedented detail.
The ANC’s posture towards Iran comes at significant cost to South Africa’s moral authority and international standing. Over the past 18 months Iran has become increasingly isolated. Its regional proxies, including Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis, have been decimated, while its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes have suffered significant setbacks following actions by Israel and the US.
Now another key Iranian ally, Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela, sits in a New York prison. Through the ANC, South Africa is rapidly becoming one of a shrinking number of states willing to shoulder the burden to defend and enable the policies of this repressive regime. Ultimately, however, it is the people of Iran and South Africans who may end up paying the price.
• Shulman is director of the Middle East Africa Research Institute.
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